

## Abstract

In the first part, it is initially shown that the "logical I" is already present in Kant's precritical philosophy. In the critical philosophy period, the "I" is an expression of the intellectual selfconsciousness of a being endowed with understanding, meaning one that is conscious of its representations and thoughts. Accordingly, selfconsciousness is not a kind of consciousness specified by its object, insofar as all consciousness implies the selfconsciousness of that which is conscious of a representation or an object. According to the *Anthropology*, the I of selfconsciousness is a person that, in all her supervening changes, can be conscious of herself as the selfsame person. This conception entails Kant's dependence upon Locke in the former's concept of person. The second part of the article deals with apperception as a condition of thought, the logical I that grounds every thought as the action of representing in the concept and in every judgment, and that to this extent belongs to Logic. This selfconsciousness, which is presented by Kant as the analytical and synthetical unity of apperception, is qua objective synthetical unity of apperception, at once, the logical form of all judgments and the principle of all categories. The third part deals with the paralogism of personality, whereby the real numerical identity of the subject is falsely deduced from the formal consciousness of the numerical identity of itself. However,

from the impossibility of the theoretical proof of the personality of the soul it does not follow that the subject in the practical, moral use of her/his freedom cannot be thought as a person. It is thus shown that moral personality and logical/psychological personality belong together, and that the freedom presupposed for imputability renders the subject of this imputation a moral personality. This personality in the ethical sense raises human beings above themselves as a part of the sensible world, and only to them is due positive freedom or the autonomy of the person.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Resumo traduzido ao inglês por Nythamar de Oliveira.

## Disinterestedness and objectivity: Nietzsche on Schopenhauer and Kant<sup>1</sup>

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### I

In some well-known remarks in the Third Essay of his *On the Genealogy of Morality* (GM) Nietzsche links the names of Kant and Schopenhauer, and attacks both for their view of aesthetic experience, chiefly for their reliance on the central concept of disinterestedness. He is not the only thinker to bracket the aesthetic thought of Kant and Schopenhauer closely together. Today commentators on Schopenhauer's aesthetics have been known to complain that he never properly acknowledges how much he has taken from Kant, and aestheticians sometimes characterize Kant's aesthetic theory, inadvertently perhaps, as if it were a version of Schopenhauer's. One lesson I hope to deliver here is that the aesthetic theories of Schopenhauer and Kant are significantly different from one another. A corollary lesson is that Kant's theory is greatly preferable. Whether it survives all of Nietzsche's objections to it, however, is another question.

### II

Let us next simply put on the table some extracts from Nietzsche's discussion in GM that will provide us with our basic material.

<sup>1</sup> This paper brings together ideas that I have presented in a number of earlier publications. See Janaway 1993; Janaway 1996; Janaway 1997; Janaway 1998.

Schopenhauer used the Kantian formulation of the aesthetic problem for his own purpose — although he almost certainly did not view it with Kantian eyes. Kant intended to honor art when, among the predicates of the beautiful he privileged and placed in the foreground those that constitute the honor of knowledge: impersonality and universal validity. ... I wish only to underscore that Kant, like all philosophers, instead of envisaging the aesthetic problem starting from the experiences of the artist (the one who creates), thought about art and the beautiful from the viewpoint of the 'spectator' ... If only this 'spectator' had at least been sufficiently familiar to the philosophers of the beautiful, however! — namely as a great *personal* fact and experience, as a wealth of most intense personal experiences, desires, surprises, delights in the realm of the beautiful! ... 'The beautiful,' Kant said, 'is what pleases *without interest*.' Without interest! Compare this definition with one made by a real 'spectator' and artist — Stendhal, who in one place calls the beautiful *une promesse de bonheur*. What is rejected and crossed out here, in any case, is precisely the one thing that Kant emphasizes in the aesthetic condition: *le désintéressement*. Who is right, Kant or Stendhal? (Nietzsche 1998: 72) disinterested contemplation [*interesselose Anschauung*]' [is] a non-concept and an absurdity ... For let us guard ourselves better from now on, gentlemen philosophers, against the dangerous old conceptual fabrication that posited a 'pure, will-less, timeless subject of knowledge'; let us guard ourselves against the tentacles of such contradictory concepts as 'pure reason,' 'absolute spirituality,' 'knowledge in itself': here it is always demanded that we think an eye that cannot possibly be thought, an eye that must not have any direction, in which the active and interpreting forces through which seeing first becomes seeing-something are to be shut off, are to be absent; thus what is demanded here is always an absurdity and non-concept of an eye. There is *only* a perspectival seeing, *only* a perspectival 'knowing' ... to eliminate the will altogether, to disconnect the affects one and all, supposing that we were capable of this: what? would that not be to *castrate* the intellect? (Nietzsche 1998: 85)

Summarizing Nietzsche is never an easy task. And there are many lines of interpretation we could follow from this point. I shall not be addressing Nietzsche's perspectivism as it is usually treated, as an attack on the conception of knowledge found in Kant's theoretical philosophy, and in much of the philosophical tradition. Instead let me mark out four distinct charges which Nietzsche explicitly or implicitly makes against Kant's aesthetic theory:

1. Kant's aesthetics is erroneous because it is constructed from the point of view of the receptive judging spectator, rather than the active, creating artist.
2. The Kantian conception of beauty as detached from desire is wrong.
3. Kant falsifies the nature of the experience of art and beauty by conceiving them impersonally.
4. Disinterested intuition is, like the supposed 'pure will-less subject' of Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory, an impossibility for the human intellect.

### III

I shall deal quite briefly with the first three points, concerning creative activity, beauty and desire, and impersonality.

First, then, Nietzsche's complaint about creative activity: that Kant conceives his aesthetic theory from the point of view of the judging spectator who passively receives experience, rather than from the point of view of the active, creating artist. On Kant's behalf we might offer the following reply: his theory of aesthetic judgement, of the judgement of taste, or the judgement of something's beauty, is conceived from the point of view — of course — of someone who makes a judgement on the basis of his or her experience of some object. In the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' Kant takes as his theme judgement, and more particularly the judgement of beauty, and we should not fault him for not having done something different: *i.e.* for not taking as his general theme art, and as his more particular theme the relation of the art work to the process of creative production.

Besides, as is well known, Kant does give in §§43–53 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgement* (Kant 2000: 182–207/Ak. 5: 303–330) an account of the production of art through genius, the ‘inborn productive faculty of the artist’ or ‘a talent for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given’, of which he says ‘originality must be its primary characteristic’ (Kant 2000: 186/Ak. 5: 307–8). Genius enables the rare human being to find thought-animating aesthetic ideas in imagination and express them in perceptual form (Kant 2000: 192–5/Ak. 5: 314–318). All of this is conceived of as original, non-rule-governed and exceptional activity on the part of the artist — surely that is a few steps in the right direction for Nietzsche?

Here we touch on a traditional problem about Kant’s aesthetic theory, however: how well do his account of pure judgements of beauty in the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ and his later account of expressive artistic genius fit together? Can there be an account of art that takes the idea of free beauty as its guiding thread? Consider that the value of art is to involve the apprehension of a specific kind of content, namely imaginative aesthetic ideas, while free beauty is explained in terms of a pleasure which does not mention such a content; consider that free beauty is exemplified as much, perhaps more, by natural objects, in whose existence no human productive talent is implicated. The traditional worry is that Kant’s aesthetic theory is broken-backed, in that what is analysed as beauty does not apply itself well to the case of art. But even if this is the case, we do not have to conclude that Kant’s account of pure aesthetic judgement in the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ is an error. It might be an error to believe that art could be accounted for solely in terms of pure judgements of beauty. I am sympathetic to the line taken recently by the American aesthetician Noël Carroll, that aesthetics has been mistaken when, over the centuries, it has consistently attempted to ‘reduce art to beauty’ (Carroll 2001: 23). But that leaves us with beauty, and judgements about beauty, still to discuss: and Kant’s notion that a judgement of beauty is grounded in a disinterested satisfaction or liking for the experience of perceiving an object may still be a contender in this field.

The second complaint we isolated in Nietzsche’s discussion was that the detachment of beauty from desire is wrong and even unnatural. In another passage (in *Twilight of the Idols*) Nietzsche says that Schopenhauer wants to

see in beauty ‘the negation of the drive to procreation’ (another expression for ‘will to life’) — to which Nietzsche then replies ‘Someone contradicts you, and I fear it is nature’ (Nietzsche 1990: 91). In *GM* III he makes essentially the same point against Kant, contrasting Kant’s conception of disinterestedness unfavourably with Stendhal’s conception ‘*une promesse de bonheur*’ (Nietzsche 1998: 72). Beauty, according to this alternative view, concerns the perception of something in which we discern a relation to the satisfaction of desires, the most basic of which are sexual desires.

To this challenge there is also a reply on Kant’s behalf. It may well be true that beauty, *Schönheit*, and other terms, apply to that in human beings which is desirable. The early twentieth-century English aesthetician Clive Bell rejected ‘beautiful’ as an aesthetic term for this very reason:

Surely it is not what I call an aesthetic emotion that most of us feel, generally, for natural beauty. . . . When an ordinary man speaks of a beautiful woman he certainly does not mean that she moves him aesthetically . . . With the man in the street ‘beautiful’ is more often than not synonymous with ‘desirable’. (Bell 1969: 89–90)

But that the term has this use does not prevent there being a further sense to the term ‘beautiful’, in which it is synonymous with ‘having aesthetic value’. In other words, ‘beautiful’ might be an ambiguous term, in common use having a connection with desirability, in slightly more specialized use lacking that connection. Nor is this distinctly aesthetic use really the preserve of specialists. Most people would be quite ready to describe a piece of music, a tree, or a landscape as beautiful, without its being the case that they envisage the satisfaction of any particular desires by the object in question. So once again, Kant’s project of delineating what it is to judge some object aesthetically beautiful need not be impugned. Purely aesthetic judgement might not be present every time we describe something as ‘beautiful’. But it cannot be concluded from that that purely aesthetic judgement never occurs when we describe something as ‘beautiful’. There is something left for Kant to analyse in the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’.

The third point we drew from Nietzsche was the idea that Kant is wrong in thinking of the encounter with beauty in impersonal terms. Nietzsche is perceptive in his comment that Kant gives to beauty the predicates which constitute the honour of knowledge, impersonality and universal validity, but, as Nietzsche may not realize, a judgement of beauty is not a knowledge-claim at all for Kant: a point I shall return to later. Nietzsche writes of a 'wealth of most intense personal experiences, desires, surprises, delights', which get forgotten in the Kantian account of impersonal judgement. Here again it is clear that only a misconception of Kant's aim would properly sustain the objection. Kant is seeking to account for a *particular kind* of judgement in which we claim to speak with more than our own subjective voice. No one can sensibly deny that aesthetic experience often has an intense personal quality. But Kant's central concern is not the phenomenology of personal interaction with an object one finds beautiful; rather it is the analysis of aesthetic judgements. His question is, obviously, how it can be legitimate for one person to claim the agreement of others in judging an object beautiful. He is seeking to account for a *particular kind* of judgement in which we claim to speak with more than our own subjective voice. Nietzsche's challenge might be construed as the view that there are only purely personal reactions in the aesthetic sphere and that the Kantian quest is the pursuit of a mere illusion. But arguably that view is false.

When we consider the vast spectrum from the purely personal to the universal, there are questions about, as it were, day-to-day aesthetic life that Kant's theory fails to address. For example, is it really the case that we demand the same response to an object from *all* judging subjects? Why not a smaller subset of subjects? Let us imagine an example from music. If we are in the habit of attending concerts of renaissance music, do we really judge a particular performance with an eye towards what *everyone* would think? The verdict of a fellow enthusiast will be of burning importance. Our seeking for agreement will also be pronounced in respect of people with whom we share our lives and opinions. But do we care how people with little interest in music would respond? Do we even care whether people who appreciate mainly jazz or opera would feel the same satisfaction as we do and agree with our judgement?

Against Kant, then, our practice in making aesthetic judgements might suggest that the demand for universality is too ambitious. That thought is, admittedly, inimical to Kant's larger philosophical enterprise in the third *Critique*: he needs universality to secure the legitimacy of judgements of taste by connecting them with the operation of the cognitive faculties; and without universality the parallel between beauty and morality is harder to sustain. However, if we are simply looking for a more realistic aesthetic theory, and think that the demand for universality in aesthetic judgements is too ambitious, we still need not retreat all the way to the purely personal. If we think there is an issue about aesthetic judgements, concerning how one can reach agreement between even some persons, then we cannot be content to follow Nietzsche's lead and account the aesthetic merely a realm of diverse personal responses. Once again, the analysis and legitimation of aesthetic judgement is Kant's central concern, not the personal phenomenology of the individual subject. And there are aesthetic judgements which claim more than personal status — again vindicating at least one major element of Kant's project in the 'Analytic of the Beautiful'.

#### IV

I want now to move to the fourth charge I listed above: the claim that disinterested intuition is, like the supposed 'pure will-less subject' of Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory, an impossibility for the human intellect. The culmination of Nietzsche's attack on disinterestedness comes in our second quoted passage, from section 12 of *GM* III, where he links it with a certain conception of objectivity. Nietzsche would like a new, perspectivist conception of objectivity, so that objectivity is *not* understood as the Kantian-sounding 'disinterested intuition' (*interesselose Anschauung*), which, he adds, 'is a non-concept and absurdity'. And he goes on to warn against the temptations of the contradictory 'pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge' — precisely Schopenhauer's formulation for the subject of aesthetic experience. To understand what is being claimed here we must reconstitute a little of Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory.



For Schopenhauer aesthetic experience is a state of will-lessness. All our desires and interests are suspended, and we exist merely as a subject of knowledge that mirrors the world without imposing subjective forms upon it. In particular, space and time and causality are absent as organizing forms of our experience. We abandon ordinary empirical consciousness for a 'higher' consciousness; we perceive not the ordinary *spatio-temporal* world of particular material things, but universal Ideas, which Schopenhauer conceives along Platonic lines. This state of aesthetic suspension has, allegedly, two features of value: (1) because the will is temporarily absent, we enter a state of unusual calm, in which striving, seeking, fleeing, and, most importantly, suffering, cannot occur. (2) we achieve greater objectivity than we do in our rule-governed empirical knowledge of the world. Schopenhauer reasons as follows:

1. Empirical consciousness of the world is always within the forms of space, time and causality imposed by the subject.

2. The subject's intellectual imposition of space, time and causality on experience is driven by human needs, interests and affects (in short, intellect is governed by will).

3. The 'higher' aesthetic consciousness is a form of contemplation by the intellect quite independent of human needs, interests and affects.

4. So the aesthetic consciousness is independent also of those subjective forms (space, time and causality) that are necessitated by our having needs, interests and affects.

5. So aesthetic consciousness is a more objective cognition of the world than ordinary empirical consciousness.

There are many points to raise about this argument. But one thing is apparent: Schopenhauer is much less of a Kantian than is sometimes supposed. Having accepted the Kantian framework of space, time and causality as governing empirical knowledge of the world, Schopenhauer firstly attributes to this framework a purely instrumental necessity: experiencing causally ordered material objects in space and time is a condition of our inhabiting the world in such a way as to satisfy our desires and needs, to predict and manipulate things. Will, or indeed what he calls will to life (*Wille zum Leben*), is primary in human beings and explains the ordinary operation of their

intellect. This leaves the way open for the second, drastic move Schopenhauer makes: that when we step back from willing, the Kantian rules about experience and knowledge simply need not apply. Will-free cognition is allowed to break the rules, and is portrayed as superior because it does so.

The vision behind Schopenhauer's theory of aesthetic experience is Platonic, not Kantian. Objects of knowledge exist beyond the empirical realm, beyond mere appearance, and cognition of them is an abnormal and uncommonly uplifting state of mind. The objects of this cognition, which Schopenhauer even calls Platonic Ideas, are universals rather than particular spatio-temporal objects, and they are not subject to time, change, or causality. Plato would also be horrified, incidentally, because these Ideas are supposed to be known by a kind of perception which excludes conceptual thought and ratiocination. It is not reason that takes us to the higher realm for Schopenhauer, as reason is demoted also to an instrumental role in our survival as living creatures. So what happens in aesthetic experience, according to Schopenhauer, is that we free ourselves of the will, and

we relinquish the ordinary way of regarding things, and cease to follow under the guidance of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason merely their relations to one another ... Thus we no longer consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither in things, but simply and solely the *what*. Further, we do not let abstract thought, the concepts of reason, take possession of our consciousness, but, instead of all this, devote the whole power of our mind to perception, sink ourselves completely therein, and let our whole consciousness be filled by the calm contemplation of the natural object. (Schopenhauer 1969: 178)

The next comment I would make is that Nietzsche's criticism is well-aimed at Schopenhauer's theory. For it is Schopenhauer himself who insists that ordinary cognition is driven by will, that ordinarily we do not exist as a 'pure subject of knowledge', because we are embodied willing beings with never-ending needs, desires, and sufferings (see Schopenhauer 1969: 196–7). The forms of space, time and causality are imposed by an organic creature

striving to survive and manipulate its environment. The notion of pure cognition of timeless Ideas transgresses Schopenhauer's own conception of the human subject as rooted in embodiment and driven by will. Having made will to life the explanatory basis of the human intellect and its capacity for empirical knowledge and reason, Schopenhauer apparently wishes it were not so: he yearns for an older Platonic state of knowledge, which according to his own theory is not possible for the ordinary human subject. Aesthetic experiences therefore become the exception: a precious opportunity to revisit the Platonic conception of a 'purer' knowing consciousness and a 'higher' realm of objects for it to know.

How does all this relate to Kant's aesthetic theory? Superficially the theories of Kant and Schopenhauer are similar. Kant says that a judgement of something's beauty is grounded in a disinterested, or (as I shall say) non-desire-based feeling of satisfaction; and that it is made 'without concepts'. So when Nietzsche criticizes pure aesthetic contemplation as absurd and impossible, how much of the criticism carries over to Kant?

Firstly, Kant does not think aesthetic experience is a superior route to objective cognition. The very first sentences of Kant's 'Analytic of the Beautiful' make it clear that the judgement of taste is not a cognitive judgement:

In order to decide whether or not something is beautiful, we do not relate the representation by means of understanding to the object for cognition, but rather relate it ... to the subject and its feeling of pleasure and displeasure. The judgment of taste is therefore not a cognitive judgment, hence not a logical one, but is rather aesthetic, by which is understood one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective. ... the feeling of pleasure and displeasure ... grounds an entirely special faculty for discriminating and judging that contributes nothing to cognition. (Kant 2000: 89–90/Ak. 5: 203–204)

And throughout his attempt to found the authority of aesthetic judgements upon the workings of the very cognitive powers that do supply us with empirical knowledge, Kant says we treat beauty merely 'as if [it] were

a property of the object and the judgment logical (constituting a cognition of the object through concepts of it)', reminding us occasionally that 'it is only aesthetic [feeling-based] and contains merely a relation of the object to the subject' (Kant 2000: 97/Ak. 5: 211).

An essential point to remember is that in Kant's position the expression 'disinterested' qualifies what he calls *Wohlgefallen*, liking or satisfaction. His aesthetic theory posits not a 'will-free consciousness', but something like 'a satisfaction not related to the fulfilment of desires'. The detail of Kant's exposition of disinterestedness in sections 1–5 of the third *Critique* has never been found particularly satisfactory by commentators.<sup>2</sup> I shall merely gloss *Wohlgefallen ohne Interesse* as a liking or satisfaction which is not essentially desire-related. The characterization of this *Wohlgefallen* is not made in terms of phenomenology or what it feels like for the subject: rather it is the relation of the satisfaction to desires or ends that is crucial (see Kant 2000: 95/Ak. 5: 209–210). And disinterestedness amounts to a negative condition upon this relation: the satisfaction that grounds a judgement of taste must be one that is *not* caused by the subject's desires towards the object judged. Such desires may be present, but it cannot be they that give rise to satisfaction, if satisfaction is to be the ground of a judgement of taste.

Nothing in Kant's position demands that the subject's state of consciousness be radically altered, or that the subject altogether lack desires, or that the object of experience can no longer be related to other things in space and time, or that it no longer be tractable by conceptual thought. On the contrary, if we are to judge an object we must locate it in space and time, and we must be applying concepts to it. Schopenhauer happily accepts that there are exceptions to the well known rule that 'intuitions without concepts are blind'. Kant cannot and does not accept this, even in his theory of aesthetics.

<sup>2</sup> Right down to the Editor's Introduction of the new Cambridge translation, where we find the view that §§6–9, sections coming after the discussion of disinterestedness, 'in many ways ... can be considered the real starting point of Kant's account' (Kant 2000: xxviii).

Writers in aesthetics sometimes assume the contrary, misled by Kant's pronouncements about judgements of beauty being '*ohne Begriffe*'. The distinguished writer on aesthetics, Richard Wollheim, suggests that Kant 'define[s] the ideal critic as one whose cognitive stock is empty, or who brings to bear upon the work of art zero knowledge, beliefs, and concepts'. He adds that 'The proposal ... is all but impossible to put into practice, and, if it could be, it would lead to critical judgments that would be universally unacceptable.' (Wollheim 1980: 194)

But I would argue that this is a misunderstanding of Kant. Kant's '*ohne Begriffe*' means something quite specific: that the *ground* for the judgement of an object's beauty is *not* the object's being cognized as falling under any particular concept. To take an example: a beautiful tiger is not to be judged beautiful because of its being a tiger, because of its being a mammal or from Siberia, or because of its being a certain colour or size. Rather, the ground of the judgement must be the *Wohlgefallen* felt merely in the presentation of the tiger in the subject's experience. My points here are two: that the Kantian subject who judges the tiger beautiful must classify it using concepts — so as not to fall into an experience which is absurdly 'blind' to all objects — and that Kant's notion that the judgement is *ohne Begriffe* in no way conflicts with that.

These are vital points concerning Kant's aesthetics, sadly all too often missed. If you interpret Kant as saying that only an experience devoid of conceptual classifications can be the ground for a judgement of a thing's aesthetic value, you do indeed attribute to Kant an unworkable view of the way aesthetic judgements are made about works of art. For often a large body of conceptual knowledge built up patiently over years is needed in order to perceive the object of one's attention with sufficient understanding to appreciate it aesthetically. Musical structure perhaps provides a good example. Use of many sophisticated conceptual classifications — canon, fugue, cadence, suspension, recapitulation, etc. — might be necessary for many listeners as a means to hearing musical form in a certain piece. But the object's falling under such conceptual classifications need be neither the *cause of one's satisfaction* nor the *ground for one's judgement* of the music's aesthetic value. For the cause of one's pleasure or satisfaction could still be the form that one actually hears in the music; and

the ground of one's judgement of the object as beautiful or aesthetically good could be simply this pleasure or satisfaction. Kant equates the requisite pleasure with consciousness of a 'subjective purposiveness' in the representation of the object (Kant 2000, 106, 107/Ak. 5: 221, 222). This consciousness is brought about by a 'free play of the imagination and understanding', which accompanies the presentation of an object.<sup>3</sup> Another way to put the points I am arguing for is to say that (1) it is the free play of the cognitive faculties that causes satisfaction in the case of an aesthetic judgement, not cognition itself; but that (2) cognition of the object need not be absent.

A full discussion of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' is not possible here; a diagram (Figure 1) may help to elucidate the connections I would argue to obtain between some of its elements.<sup>4</sup>




Figure 1.

<sup>3</sup> 'The consciousness of the merely formal purposiveness in the play of the cognitive powers of the subject in the case of (*bei*) a representation through which an object is given is the pleasure itself.' (Kant 2000: 107/Ak. 5: 222)

<sup>4</sup> An earlier version of this diagram, with supporting argumentation, appeared in Janaway 1997.

## V

In summary: for Kant disinterested satisfaction makes no claim to be a route to cognitive 'objectivity' or any species of 'knowing'; and the 'active and interpreting forces' that govern experience need not be absent for disinterested satisfaction to occur. So Nietzsche's argument against the Schopenhauerian 'will-less timeless subject' of objective cognition is not an argument against anything in Kant's aesthetic theory, and Nietzsche is a little irresponsible (no surprises there) in giving the impression that Kant is implicated in the specifically Schopenhauerian view he criticizes. And, as I argued earlier, the project of analysing the intersubjectivity of one kind of judgement of beauty which experiencing subjects make, on the basis of a satisfaction which is *ohne Interesse*, remains a legitimate project — even if not the only one for aesthetics and the philosophy of art to undertake.

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## Resumo

Na *Genealogia da Moral* III Nietzsche critica as teorias estéticas de Kant e de Schopenhauer, objectando em particular à idéia do desinteresse. Neste artigo tento avaliar o impacto dessas críticas sobre a teoria de Kant na *Crítica do Juízo*. Examino quatro críticas apresentadas por Nietzsche: que Kant conceba a estética do ponto da vista da receptividade, não da criatividade; que Kant não deveria ter separado beleza de desejo; que ele torna a experiência da arte e da beleza muito impessoal; e que 'intuição desinteressada' é algo impossível. Sustento que a posição de Kant pode ser defendida, pelo menos com algumas modificações. Faço uma interpretação da 'Analítica do Belo', na qual defendo Kant contra as usuais críticas às suas noções 'juízos sem conceitos' e 'satisfação sem interesse'. A teoria de Schopenhauer é vulnerável à crítica de Nietzsche no que se refere à noção de desinteresse; é incorreto, porém, assimilar as teorias de Schopenhauer e Kant.

## Abstract

In *On the Genealogy of Morality* III Nietzsche criticizes the aesthetic theories of Kant and Schopenhauer, objecting in particular to the notion of disinterestedness. In this article I try to assess the impact of these criticisms on Kant's theory in the *Critique of Judgement*. I examine four criticisms made by Nietzsche: that Kant conceives aesthetics only from the point of view of receptivity, not creativity; that he should not have detached beauty from desire; that he makes the experience of art and beauty too impersonal; and that 'disinterested intuition' is impossible. I argue that Kant's position can be defended, at least with some modifications. I give an interpretation of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' which saves Kant from common accusations about his notions of judgement 'without concepts' and 'satisfaction without interest'. Schopenhauer's theory is vulnerable to Nietzsche's criticism of disinterestedness, but it is mistaken to assimilate his theory to Kant's.

## O Valor crítico do conceito de reflexão em Kant

Antonio Marques

No que se segue gostaríamos de aprofundar na medida do possível a relação entre *crítica* e *reflexão* na filosofia de Kant. Pretendemos mostrar que a avaliação da natureza crítica da sua filosofia passa em grande parte pela avaliação do conceito de *reflexão* ou das formas que esse conceito adquire em momentos diferentes das suas obras. Assume-se que o estudo sistemático desta articulação íntima não se encontra suficientemente presente no comentário da filosofia kantiana e que sem ela se perde uma dimensão crucial do que deve ser a actividade do filósofo crítico, no sentido transcendental que aqui nos interessa. A filosofia crítica é sobretudo uma *actividade*, não uma doutrina, é uma atenção redobrada, e de um certo tipo, ao modo como pensamos, ao modo como *usamos* os nossos conceitos. Defenderemos sobretudo que a actividade crítica que Kant nos expõe, ao longo sobretudo das suas três Críticas, dos diferentes tipos de juízo adquire a sua plenitude crítica quando o filósofo domina a técnica da *reflexão transcendental*. Este será mesmo o tópico central deste texto, o qual poderia formular deste modo: a filosofia como actividade crítica é essencialmente *reflexão* transcendental, a qual conserva praticamente a mesma estrutura ao longo do sistema crítico, como se verificará mediante o estudo do conceito de *reflexão*, quer na primeira, quer na terceira Críticas. No entanto procuraremos dar conta de uma evolução no interior dessa estrutura contínua. É certamente correcto dizer que a estrutura permanece a mesma, mas veremos também que a última Crítica, ao introduzir o conceito de uma faculdade do juízo e em particular uma faculdade de juízo *reflexiva*, enriquece o conceito de actividade reflexiva e portanto o