The Spherical Shape of Reason: Theoretical Implications in Kant’s Cosmopolitan Right

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1.

What does Kant mean by “universal hospitality”? And what relationship does it have with cosmopolitan right? And again: in what sense and within what limits is it permissible to talk of a right to hospitality in Kant? Answering these questions is not at all simple, above all because Kant’s writings lend themselves to different interpretations, when they do not produce real misunderstandings. And after all, on such burning themes, which touch very closely the sensibility of the contemporary reader, even very slight interpretive oscillations or simple variations in tone can produce insurmountable barriers or serve the cause of irreconcilable ideological positions.

Kant, as is well known, speaks of universal hospitality in the Third definitive Article of Perpetual Peace. More precisely, he speaks of conditions of universal hospitality to which cosmopolitan right must be limited (Cf. ZeF AA 08: 358. 20-21).1

This formula is not something that can be immediately understood. Indeed, what does limiting cosmopolitan right mean? And what are the conditions of universal hospitality? On this point the essay on Perpetual Peace does not work out a true systematic construct. So the onus is on the reader to weave together in a precise way the threads of a line of thought that in reality still has the form of a sketch, which awaits the hand of the artist to be specified in all its parts.

In effect, Kant is interested, first of all, in tracing out the lines of a “Philosophical Sketch”, to quote the terms that appear in the subtitle of the essay Toward Perpetual Peace. The expression “philosophischer Entwurf” qualifies a precise modality of approach to issues of a political and legal order. Concepts like

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“progress”, “civilization”, “permanent peace” and “cosmopolitical society” are part of a philosophical Sketch because they make reference to a use of reason that goes beyond what can be inferred from simple experience. And this is true insofar as they are linked to a design and a description of the historical course of events that no experience is able to guarantee. For these concepts, therefore, there is again proposed, although in a different form compared to the so-called “metaphysical writings”, the question of legitimacy, in the philosophical-legal sense of a not simply empirical deduction of them. Thus when, for example, Kant speaks of perpetual peace as a “not simply chimerical goal” (ZeF, AA 08: 368, 19-20) his intention is always to identify the limits within which the reference to such a goal, to this idea of reason, can exhibit a right to legitimacy, possibly even only as a normative principle for the construction of a world order which gradually moves further and further from the threat of violence and war. And it is not by chance that, proposing the hypothesis of a peaceful confederation among states as a form of provisional organization in view of a more lasting peace, Kant resorts to transcendental jargon and speaks of “objective reality [objective Realität]” of his “idea of federalism” (ZeF, AA 08: 356.15); whose practicability “can be shown [lässt sich darstellen].” (ZeF, AA 08: 356.17) These are already evident examples of how the political issue of the feasibility of a project is welded to the theoretical issue of the legitimate use of a concept of reason, in relation to which experience does not give an opportunity of immediate verification. Or again, when in the Second section of The Contest of the Faculties Kant wonders in what order we can expect progress of humanity toward the better (SF, AA 07: 92.12-13), he merely reiterates, on the terrain of what he calls “moral history of the human being” (SF, AA 07: 79.14), the question of the legitimacy of the use of the concept of progress, in relation to which he affirms, and not by chance, that it is an issue that cannot immediately be resolved through experience (SF, AA 07: 83.02-03). Or, lastly – but the list could continue – when in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View he speaks of cosmopolitical society as a regulative principle, Kant is answering the philosophical question about the legitimacy of the use of a concept of reason, whose meaning cannot reside in a use of this concept as a constitutive principle, “the principle of anticipating lasting peace amidst the most vigorous actions and reactions of human beings.” (Anth, AA 07: 331.25-27)

The critical-transcendental issue of the legitimacy of the use of concepts that on one side refuse direct empirical verification but on the other hand demand, as concepts of reason, a non-arbitrary status constitutes the indispensable background

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2 Referring to the line of reasoning followed in The Contest of the Faculties, de Freitas Meirelles (2008, 685) stresses that Kant measures reflection on the possibility of progress of humankind with the parameters of transcendental philosophy.

to Kant’s reflection – even where the latter takes on the more specific profile of a political proposal on the modalities with which the danger of violence and war can and must be curbed with the means of right.

A decisive role is played precisely by the counterfactual resources that right, as a concept of reason, can offer for guaranteeing, though only in the form of a progressive approximation towards the optimal situation, that durable condition of justice and peace that cannot instead be the object of a simple forecast founded upon what is afforded by the spectacle of human vicissitudes.

Right, in short, constitutes, we could say, the cornerstone of the philosophical-political discourse on progress and peace. This is all the more so because right constitutes an essential condition for the development of the rational dispositions of man – that development, that progress, in virtue of which, alone, man can become worthy, in the sense of having the legitimate right, of the appellative of rational being.

Right, in effect, reminds man that he does not have reason in the simple natural form of an anthropological endowment. For this reason, indeed, the only anthropological knowledge that can concern man as a rational being concerns not “what nature makes of the human being” (Anth, AA 07:119.12), but “what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself.” (Anth, AA 07:119.13-14) Precisely the pragmatic point of view makes reference to an anthropology that is “knowledge of the human being as a citizen of the world.” (Anth, AA 07:120. 05-06) That is to say, the figure of the citizen of the world marks acquisition of a title in virtue of which man can legitimately vindicate the possession of reason not because he is simply endowed with the physiological possibility of using it, i.e. as “animal rationabile” (Anth, AA 07: 321.33), but in relation to a use of reason addressed to what interests humanity, and indeed interests every man as able to think of his own humanity as a common task to be performed together with other men.

Kant thus offers quite a peculiar version of the traditional formula of man/political animal. That is to say, it is not a matter of tracking down in man a natural tendency to sociality, but of highlighting the affiliation of every individual to the human species as an affiliation mediated by his ability to share with other men the assignments that on every person, singly taken, are imposed by simple reason, so that simple reason becomes shared, common, reason and therefore suited to forming customs and institutions.

This is equivalent to saying that man’s political nature does not prove to be simply anchored to the anthropological datum of a rationality of which he disposes

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4 “[...] right is a pure practical rational concept of choice under laws of freedom” (MS, AA 06:249.21-22).
5 “Only for the fact that the historical-factual element, Realpolitik, is submitted to the idea of right, can the world of human action, inconsistent in itself, left at the mercy of chance, achieve perpetual peace” (Malter 1984, 70).
per definitione. In this sense it is philosophically irrelevant whether man is a political being by nature or not. Rather, the possibility of speaking of human nature, that is to say of a species to which every man can say he belongs, requires the long times of history, during which man is called on to develop his own dispositions to the use of reason. And the whole development of such dispositions has as a condition the entry of man into the civil status; a status that, for the purpose of guaranteeing an order of world peace, must be able to be extended beyond the domestic limits of ius civitatis, to involve relationships between peoples.

The natural law or rational law idea of right founded upon “human reason”6 coexists, in short, with the idea that right, in its public form, constitutes a condition, the womb (as Kant says (IaG, AA 08:28.35)7), for the development of the natural disposition of man to the use of reason itself.

The problems, the conflicts and, with them, however, also the indefeasible richness of Kant’s cosmopolitical proposal essentially lies, as will be seen, in this tension, internal to the very concept of human reason, between the transcendental order concerning man as a rational being and the contingent, historical sense of a rationality given to man only as a disposition that waits to be developed. In the latter sense, which defines the very idea of progress, the history of humankind, discussed in Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective at bottom is also the history of the constitution of a genus commune founded upon use of reason. In other words, every man can only belong legitimately to humankind in virtue of his ability and intent to approach other men to form with them a society founded upon right. This is because only the attainment of a civil condition can guarantee free development of the human dispositions to the use of reason.

2.

This means that the human being and his intimate relationship with the rational being depend on the ability to found a peculiar form of citizenship through which every individual can say not only in fact but also by right that he or she is part of humankind.

Then the reference to the more specific meaning that the adjective “cosmopolitan” takes on when in Toward perpetual Peace there is introduced a “cosmopolitan right” complementing state right and international right8 throws

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6 “All propositions about right are a priori propositions, since they are laws of reason (dictamina rationis)” (MS, AA 06: 249.34-35 [translated by M. Gregor: I Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. by M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996]).
greater light on the deep connection that in Kant links the doctrine of right to a consideration that affects the status of human reason. More precisely, *ius cosmopoliticum*, unlike *ius civitatis*, does not concern the relationship among individuals as parts of a state, nor is it limited to *ius gentium* that pertains to states as actors in an international order; instead, it affects both individuals and states as subjects of a “universal state of humankind.” (ZeF, AA 08:349, note) And as such, it renders even more evident the bond between right, humanity and rationality. We could say that, over and above the issue concerning the concrete institutional forms that Kant’s reference to *ius cosmopoliticum* can take on, it is in any case a decisive fact that such a right is called on first of all to give voice, at the different levels of human political organization, to the essential bond that is in place between man, *polis* and reason.

In the last analysis, for it to be possible to speak of humankind characterized by the use of reason, for humankind to be thought of as a “species of rational beings on earth [*Species vernünftiger Erdwesen*]” (Anth, AA 07: 331.32), it is necessary for man to strive for a “progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically united.” (Anth, AA 07:333. 08-10)

And the fact that both *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* and *Doctrine of Right*, in *The Metaphysic of Morals*, conclude in the sign of universal building of peace suggests, once more, the interlacement between the cosmopolitical *ideal* of legal union of men under public laws and humankind thought of as a species of reasonable terrestrial beings.

Certainly in Kant cosmopolitan right as a reference to a state of men or to citizenship of the earth going beyond legal affiliation to a given state does not take on a precise institutional form. And this has helped to nurture more than one suspicion on the function that such a right can effectively fulfil indeed in the context of a political project of world peace,9 over and above the generic appeal to a not clearly identified universal community of men.

This question brings us to the heart of the issue that we intend to deal with and that has to do, as was seen from the opening lines, with cosmopolitan right and the concept of hospitality. For the “citizens of the earth” Kant speaks of seem to be

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9 Mori (2004, 147) maintains, for example, that the third definitive article of *Perpetual Peace* “has [...] a marginal function in the economy of the work and [that] critics have often overestimated the meaning that it takes on in the picture of pacifism and, at times, of Kant’s whole legal philosophy.” This is an evaluation that insists on Kant’s reluctance to include the prerogatives brought into play by cosmopolitan right in a supranational juridical system whose coercive power goes beyond the power of self-determination of the single sovereign states. Such reluctance would in actual fact make the idea of cosmopolitical citizenship, through which individuals can be considered as submitted to a different authority than that of the state in which they live, a “dead letter”, being deprived of any external legal coerciveness (cf. *Ibidem*). On the problematic nature of Kant’s resistance to transnational application of cosmopolitan right cf. also the observations by Kleingeld (1998, 81-84), whose intention, however, is to show that the notion of cosmopolitan right is neither superfluous nor simply metaphorical, but indeed takes on decisive importance in relation to subsequent developments of international law (cf. *Ivi*, 86-87).
defined, first of all, as those people that can move freely without being treated as enemies when they first enter others’ lands. And they can do this through a “right to visit (Besuchrecht)” that belongs to every man on the basis of the “right of common possession of the surface of the earth [Recht des gemeinschaftlichen Besitzes der Oberfläche der Erde].” (ZeF, AA 08: 358.07-10) Common possession of ground coincides with a surface right that is not yet a right of ownership. The fact is that it expresses that characteristic of terrestrial ground which makes it accessible in principle to every man, in that it constitutes a whole that, as such, is not conceivable originally in terms of apportionment of property. Common possession of ground indeed represents the condition in that it constitutes the premise of that private act of choice through which first ownership is established over a territory. That is to say, on one side common possession of the earth is that on which, for Kant, there is founded every action through which people originally take possession of an isolated territory (Cf. MS, AA 06: 250.18-27), so that the first taking of possession is already valid as a claim to a right to be advanced over a territory against anyone else who would subsequently prevent him from making private use of it: “Taking first possession has therefore a rightful basis (titulus possessionis), which is original possession in common.” (MS, AA 06: 251.30-32) Besides, precisely because it is original, common possession of ground reminds anyone who has established ownership of a part of it that that part does not cease to be part of a whole and, as such, cannot in principle constitute a place inaccessible to others: “[…] possession of the land, on which an inhabitant of the earth can live, can be thought only as possession of a part of a determinate whole, and so as possession of that to which each of them originally has a right.” (MS, AA 352.11-14) In virtue of the right to common possession of the earth’s surface, writes Kant, “[…] originally no one has more of a right to be at a given place on earth than anyone else.” (ZeF, AA 08: 358.11-13) Hence the cosmopolitan right of the foreigner not to be treated hostilely on arriving on others’ land, in that it is founded upon original common possession of the ground, reminds us that every acquisition originally harks back to an action that, though included in the space of legitimacy of the right, remains arbitrary in its initial gesture. And in consideration of the arbitrary character of the initial gesture of appropriation the legitimate holder of a territory preserves at all events an obligation towards the visiting foreigner.

This obligation defines the ethical traits of an idea of community extendible to all the inhabitants of the earth, in the minimal sense that everyone has at least the right “[…] to present oneself to society (zur Gesellschaft anzubieten)” (ZeF, AA 08: 358.08), or, as we read shortly afterwards, “the possibility of attempting interaction with the old inhabitants (einen Verkehr mit den alten Einwohnern zu versuchen).”

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10 As Muthu (2000, 35) emphasizes, “Kant’s argument is that we should not presume from the simple fact that we legitimately possess a territory that this gives us the authority or the right to exclude others from it entirely.”
It is to be noticed that the right to present oneself as a member of a society, or to attempt to interact with the old tenants, does not mean the right to enter the society or to set up commercial relations. For this to happen, the consent of the other party is required. Indeed, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant condemns every attempt to enter forcibly or with deception into a relationship with peoples that live in isolation. This attempt cannot even be deceitfully be legitimated by the presumed good intention to convert to the state of right men that lead a wild life, and thus to civilize rough peoples (Cf. MS, AA 06: 353. 16-30).

Kant’s postulate of public right – according to which in the situation of inevitable coexistence with all other men, it is necessary to emerge from the natural state to enter a juridical state (Cf. MS, AA 06: 307. 08-11) cannot in any way be translated into legitimization of a behaviour of dominion, of settlement on other people’s land perpetrated under the banner of a mission of civil evangelization. This would be tantamount to claiming to requisition a universal principle to put it at the service of a particular will – what today we would define the claim to ‘export’ pre-packaged institutional models. As Kant affirms, the rule of a civil constitution binding together men that live side by side,”[...] cannot be derived from the experience of those who have hitherto found it most to their advantage; it must, rather, be derived a priori by reason from the ideal of a rightful association of human beings under public laws as such.”

That is to say, the cosmopolitical ideal of a legal union of men under public laws does not concern a normative standard that some can claim as their property, which they can therefore claim to have the right to impose on others; it concerns, instead, the sense of accessibility to the norms of rational action that nobody can deny others without losing access to reason as such. As is evident, the project of universal peace cannot therefore be linked simply to promotion and intensification of relationships of interaction and communication among men, whose guarantor would be cosmopolitan right. No less fundamental, for Kant, is the motif of insistence on the risks linked to abuse of this right. This leads to the need precisely to delimit the space of its effective exercise: “cosmopolitan right shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality.”

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11 Waldron (2004, 57) speaks, in this sense, of “Proximity Principle.”
12 MS, AA 06: 355.16-12. This is certainly valid as constitutive of Kant’s mature cosmopolitanism, in which there clearly emerges the motif of decided criticism of European colonialism. Despite this, throughout Kant’s work we meet indications that instead go in the direction of forced civilization of peoples that have not given themselves a civil constitution. Cf. e.g. R 8065, AA19: 599.27-34, datable to the period between 1780 and 1789. More in general, on the evolution of Kant’s thought on colonialism, cf. the reconstruction by Kleingeld (2014), who maintains with good reasons that criticism of colonialism without any reservations is only found in Kant beginning from the middle of the nineties (cf. esp. 52-66).
3.

This limitation is specifically expressed in Kant’s well-known distinction between right to visit and right to reside. The right to visit does not authorize the foreigner to reside in the country that hosts him. It is not, literally, a right to be a guest (Gastrecht). For the latter a special contract is required with the sovereign, which makes the visitor a cohabitant (Cf. ZeF, AA 08: 358.05-07).

The distinction between Besuchtrecht and Gastrecht has seemed to be nurtured on the background of a friction between what universally every man would be entitled to as belonging to an ideal community of rational earthly beings and the fact that we can always and only speak of a right to hospitality, in a strict sense, in relation to free agreements that depend on the will of sovereign states. Here there returns the sense of that not easy transition from the a priori plane of a (natural) right that belongs to every man as a rational being, and the historical-contingent plane of the institutions regulating the relations among men and among peoples. Moreover, this friction would seem to be accentuated when it is considered that the reference of the Gastrecht to a special convention between the sovereign and the foreigner is concretely translated into a right reserved for few people. Hence, rather than a right, it would seem to be a privilege granted by a sovereign to special “guests”, like for instance people that have commercial relationships with this or that country. To tell the truth one could immediately already observe that even such a narrow form of hospitality requires to be understood, in the first place, in the light of the more general thesis about the non-negligible role that the “spirit of trade (Handelgeist)” can play, for Kant, in view of the increase in forms of peaceful interaction among individuals belonging to different countries and of the consequent need to search for a more cordial relationship among peoples (Cf. ZeF, AA 08: 368).}

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13 Cavallar (2002, 360) explicitly links the distinction between the right to visit and the right to be a guest to Kant’s attempt to mark the “[...] transition from the a priori level of natural rights to the empirical level of agreements.” As we will see, however, Kant’s cosmopolitical formula presents an inextricable interlacement between the two planes, which ends up touching on the very heart of the concept of reason as a faculty of which every man can legitimately claim possession only insofar as access to it is not denied to others. In this way, the a priori plane of reason, as an original common possession, is closely linked to the relational plane of mutual recognition of use of the rational faculty, whose affiliation to man cannot therefore be defined in terms of simple natural possession.

14 Kleingeld (1998, 82) stresses that the reference in Toward Perpetual Peace to the spirit of trade is not sufficient to guarantee the prerogatives of cosmopolitan right, because it only guarantees hospitality of representatives of trade, not that of philosophers, tourists, refugees, etc. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Kant’s reference to the spirit of trade is inscribed in a logic that, though perhaps too optimistically, sees in the selfish drive of economic interests a possible reason for institution and intensification of relationships that at any rate also end up directly involving different figures from those involved in commercial relationships. Therefore the point is not so much whether the reference to the spirit of trade can satisfy or not the demands of universality of a right that has to concern every man. Central, rather, is the role that financial and commercial interests can play as a stimulus to
However, the very thesis that insists on the “cosmopolitical” role of the spirit of trade is not exempt from problems. These problems are faced in Kant’s text: optimistic trust in the fact that the increasing economic interaction between states and individuals belonging to different states can stimulate the formation of a global legal society cohabits with decided criticism of the imperialistic expansionism of commercial countries to the detriment of native peoples. Indeed, the motif that today would be called anti-colonialist inspires Kant’s treatment of cosmopolitan right from deep down. From this point of view the very distinction between Besuchrecht and Gastrecht finds more than a simple incentive in the need to delegitimize the deplorable behaviour of certain “visitors” that with violence or deception soon transform the visit into occupation:

> If one compares with this the inhospitable behavior of the civilized states in our part of the world, especially the commercial ones, the injustice that the latter show when visiting foreign lands and peoples (which to them is one and the same as conquering those lands and peoples) takes on terrifying proportions. America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc., were at the time of their discovery lands that they regarded as belonging to no one, for the native inhabitants counted as nothing to them. In East India (Hindustan) they brought in foreign troops under the pretext of merely intending to establish trading posts. But with these they introduced the oppression of the native inhabitants, the incitement of the different states involved to expansive wars, famine, unrest, faithlessness, and the whole litany of evils that weigh upon the human species. (ZeF, AA 08: 358-359)

The right to visit cannot in any way become a right to conquer. That is to say, it cannot legitimize violent practices of settlement and exploitation.

Attention to the anti-colonial motif also makes it possible to distinguish Kant from the facile objections that consider the distinction between Besuchrecht and Gastrecht as the product of the desire to subordinate the restriction of the right to hospitality to the mere ideological wish to exclude the foreigner. In other words, behind what could seem, at first sight, a right to hospitality limited to the paltry form of the simple right to visit, there actually speaks the concrete intent of a project. It is the one that historically identifies the universal conditions of world peace in the need to delegitimize the behaviour of economic and territorial

the search for strategies of negotiation that are alternatives to economically ruinous conflictual solutions. The spirit of trade thus simply represents a condition through which the advent of an order of peace becomes at least thinkable, in the minimal sense that the natural mechanism of selfish inclinations can prove to be – even in spite of the intentions of the actors involved – favourable to the constitution of a world order in which conflicts are not resolved with violence and war anymore. The spirit of trade constitutes, in short, a condition beginning from which the goal of perpetual peace is not a mere chimera. Then quite another matter is its actual realization, for which it is necessary, as Kant says, “to work toward this goal” (ZeF, AA 08: 368.19-20). It is necessary, that is, that to the contribution of nature there be added the decisive one of reason in view of recognition of rights whose universal scope would not prove comprehensible beginning from the single private interests of individuals and states.

15 On the motives of clash between the thesis of the spirit of trade as an element promoting cosmopolitical peace and the thesis that he denounces the imperialistic behaviour of European countries cf. Väyrynen (2001, 304).

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conquest extended from so-called civilized people against native ones. In defending the rights of these peoples against external aggressions by commercial countries, Kant becomes the spokesman of a cosmopolitan right that in no case can become the exclusive cultural apanage of European peoples, as if cosmopolitanism could mean extension and exportation on a global scale of a predetermined model of “humanity.” The desire to guarantee different forms of life, existence and culture seems in effect to be a characteristic feature of the mature cosmopolitanism of Kant. Cosmopolitical right, precisely in its limitative character, blends, to use a happy formula of Höffe’s, “a right to universal cooperation with a right to difference.” (Höffe (2008, 153). Cf. also Rossi (2008, 74))

On the other hand, the stress on the anti-colonialist motif helps, at the same time, to dampen possible facile enthusiasms regarding Kant as the theorizer of a right to universal hospitality. As we read in Toward Perpetual Peace, “The right of hospitality, that is, the right of foreign arrivals, pertains, however, only to conditions of the possibility of attempting interaction with the old inhabitants.” (ZeF, AA 08: 358.22-25) This is the space in which the right of hospitality must be limited. So we are not talking about a cosmopolitan right to universal hospitality, but, as the third definitive article states, the conditions on which the visitor’s right must be limited so that this does not contravene the conditions that make this right compatible with a universal order of peace. From this point of view, indeed, the stress is not on a right to hospitality that should universally be extended to every man. It is, rather, on the fact that in no case can this right legitimize forms of behaviour that systematically impair the exercise of other people’s will, and specifically impair the right of the first holders, that is to say the native ones. In this connection one can, indeed, trace in Kant a different way to appeal to right founded upon original common possession of the ground. We are not talking about a right that the visitor has to present himself to the person visited for a society and not to be treated as an enemy for this purpose. That is to say, it is not a matter of identifying in the right to original common possession of the earth the condition that promotes mutual interaction among men, but of protecting men from the dangers of uncontrolled interaction.

In The Metaphysics of Morals, in the section on Private Right, Kant, as mentioned, introduces original common possession as a pre-legal basis of first acquisition of territory, that is to say of the action that is at the basis of the constitution of private ownership. In this context original common possession of ground is not related to the fact that men can move freely on the earth’s surface, but is identified with the right that they have “[...] to be wherever nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed them.” (MS, AA 06: 262.18-20) Here it seems that Kant, rather than of the foreigner visiting others’ lands, is speaking of those who have lived for a long time in these places and so have been able to establish first possession of them. The original populations are those that by definition find
themselves living in a place they have not chosen, and which nature or chance has chosen for them. This is like saying that original possession of terrestrial ground that obliges the visited person not to treat the visiting foreigner as an enemy itself forces the visitor not to violate the rights of native peoples. The latter have every right to be where nature or chance has put them. The stress now seems to be not on the rights of the visitor but on those of the visited.

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Thus we see, already simply beginning from the complex way in which Kant refers to original common possession of terrestrial ground, a tension inside cosmopolitan right. On one side it involves the motif that stresses the positive content of the right to visit as a right tending to guarantee free circulation of men on earth and their interaction. The foreign visitor, whether a trader or curious traveller, according to this perspective is a healthy carrier of potential relationships suited to preparing the ground for a future of peaceful interaction among the peoples on earth. Inasmuch as it serves to guarantee the condition of the visiting foreigner, cosmopolitan right is called on to ensure the minimum conditions of conceivability of a world order of peace to be constructed in time through an appeal to institutional formulas of political cohabitation that become more and more complex as they affect larger and larger areas of the terrestrial globe. In this direction there move, for instance, the observations in the essay Toward Perpetual Peace regarding the fact that “[...] the wake of increasing culture and humankind’s gradually coming within reach of an agreement regarding their principles” rebalances the tendency to mutual hatred due to the difference of languages and religions (Cf. ZeF, AA 08: 367.22-26). Also important, as already mentioned, is the role of commercial and financial relationships that force states, if only for reasons of mutual economic convenience, to favour peace, where the right of peoples, and hence the international political order, instead would not be able to guarantee them against the danger of mutual aggression and war.

16 It is significant that in The Metaphysics of Morals Kant characterizes in mirror fashion the colonizer as the person who through his own will, and not that of nature or chance, comes into contact with other peoples, and specifically with peoples whose form of social cohabitation does not yet possess a legal framework (Cf. MS, AA 06: 266.10-20).

17 “The juridical construct of a purported common possession of the earth, which has a long and honorable antecedent in old European jurisprudence, functions as a double-edged sword in this context. On the one hand, Kant wants to avoid the justificatory use of this construct to legitimize western colonialist expansion; on the other hand, he wants to base the right of human beings to enter into civil association with one another upon the claim that, since the surface of the earth is limited, at some point or other, we must learn to enjoy its resources in common with others” (Benhabib 2004, 30).

18 The dynamic equilibrium between antagonistic drive and mutual rapprochement also furnishes, it is worth remembering, the recipe for a peace agreement between peoples that for Kant is not to be translated into despotic suppression of differences (Cf. ZeF, AA 08: 367.20-29).
On the other side, however, no less pressing in Kant is the critical motif, which stresses the need to limit every form of hospitality that risks being translated into a threat for the hosting peoples. The stress here is on the fact that the right to visit cannot and must not legitimize aggressive policies of colonial settlement. Rather than defending the cultural or commercial rights of the traveller, Kant from this point of view appears to be interested in defending the rights of native populations, or, in more general terms, in justifying the attitude of those governments that adopt cautious policies towards the foreign visitor.\(^{19}\)

It is to be noticed that these are not two ideas that necessarily contradict one another: conceiving a right to visit in virtue of which the foreigner cannot be attacked without a reason on first entering others’ land is not by itself incompatible with the fact that the visited person has to be protected from possible aggressions by the visitor through a limitation of the right to hospitality. What produces conflict, instead, is stressing one of these two aspects, possibly exaggerating its scope to the disadvantage of the other.

Various authors have insisted on the first aspect, linked to the contents of sociality and interaction among men of the cosmopolitan right to visit. Although beginning from different perspectives, they have focused attention on the positive content of the right to visit seen as the right of individuals to free circulation and free trade, whether exchange of commodities or of ideas.\(^{20}\) The stress, in this case, is on the inalienable character of a right that guarantees the action of visiting, moving freely towards one’s neighbour to establish relationships with him.

However, stress on the element of sociability of the right to visit and on its role as a possible promoter of a first form of ‘friendship’ among peoples that prepares, or even provisionally replaces, the constitution of a world political order does not cover the whole spectrum of Kant’s cosmopolitical proposal. As we have seen, no less significant are his observations on the trait of unsociability and on the inhospitable behaviour of visitors that become invaders. In paying attention to this aspect of Kant’s reflections, other authors have identified in the limitation of the right to hospitality and in the prohibition of colonialism the cosmopolitical condition of justice for being able to start to build a world order of peace.\(^{21}\)

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19 In *Toward Perpetual Peace* Kant gives the example of China and Japan (Cf. ZeF, AA 08:359.05-09).

20 Arendt (1982, 74-75) links the cosmopolitical right to visit to a formulation in a legal key of Kant’s interest in sociability of men and in the constitution of that ample mentality that, in Kant, would go through the possibility, the broadest possible, of visiting others’ points of view. In the wake of Arendt’s communicative paradigm we can also place, in some respects, the reading by Howard (1989, 101-103) which, with reference to the right to visit, talks of an obligation to pursue public communication (101-103). Other authors, like for example Schmitz (1990, 423) insist, rather, on the systematic role that the right to visit, as a right that favours interaction and rapprochement among peoples, would play in a political project of peace. Cf. also Garzón (1994, 21-23); and, more recently, Bösch (2007, 475-477, 483).

21 Observations on the importance of the criticism of colonialism within Kant’s cosmopolitan right are found, in a systematic or also an episodic form, in a large part of the Kant-Forschung. Among the first, attention was drawn to this theme by Cavallar (1992, 225-234, esp. 225-227). On the decisive role that Kant’s anti-colonial position
easily understands that here the right to visit is taken into consideration not so much as a universal norm stimulating and protecting free circulation of men on earth. It appears, rather, as form of narrow hospitality, whose prerogatives cannot extend beyond that limit beyond which minimal safety and mutual peaceful exchange among visitor and visited would not be guaranteed. Therefore it is only on the conditions of a limited right to hospitality, to quote Kant’s words, that “remote parts of the world can establish relations peacefully with one another, relations which ultimately become regulated by public laws and can thus finally bring the human species ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution.” (ZeF, AA 08: 358.25-28) Here there forcefully returns the Kantian motif of the need for man to emerge from the state of nature to enter a civil state. First of all, entering the civil state, from the cosmopolitical point of view, requires limitation of the natural right to hospitality so that it can be compatible with the very principle of the right. In other words, the will of every person, and so also individual freedom to visit foreign lands, has to agree with the will of those who can legitimately refuse to enter into society with a visitor that looks wholly like an invader. Only in this case, therefore, could one speak, correctly, of a right to hospitality, that is to say of a claim that every man can legitimately make against other men. From this point of view the trajectory of progress towards a cosmopolitical order of world peace is not identified with the simple idea of increasing social and political interaction for which supranational legislation is required. The urgent thing, instead, is to curb the risks that increasing social and political interaction can produce, when it is not conceived in the light of rules that limit its self-destructive potential. Stressing the element of sociability of cosmopolitan right, or, vice versa, the potential for unsociability triggered by the extension of antagonisms on a global scale is therefore at the basis of two different ways of reading Kant’s idea of progress. On one side at the centre there is placed valorisation of a universal law, founded upon a priori principles of reason, guaranteeing and stimulating contact and communication among peoples. On the other side, instead, the need appears decisive to curb the element of violence and misuse of power implied in the exercise of a right to hospitality not restricted to the conditions of peaceful cohabitation.

plays cf. more specifically Malter (1984, 69-85, esp. 75); Väyrynen (2001, 303-306). According to Caimi (1997, 196-197), who adopts this interpretative approach even more radically, it is not the mere individual right to visit foreign lands but the elimination of every justification of colonialism and therefore of any abuse of the right of hospitality that would be the condition to realize a cosmopolitical order of peace. The interpretative tension among the positions that consider the right to visit as a guarantee of freedoms of movement and communication and the positions that instead read in the Third Definitive Article the intention to limit the abuses of colonialism is also stressed by Terra (2008, 115-117). The reason for the tension between right to hospitality and criticism of colonialism is also the background to the reading by Thumfahrt (2013, 929-939), who however identifies in Kant’s cosmopolitan right, over and above simple criticism of colonialism, the terms of a re-formulation of ius communicationis (cf. esp. 932-934).
However, the existence of such different paradigms of reading of cosmopolitan right, and in general of Kant’s discourse on hospitality, is not only to be ascribed to the unsociable sociability of the interpreters, but is also due, as has been seen, to the fact that in Kant himself the two perspectives seem to be in an equilibrium that is not always easy.\textsuperscript{22}

Hence, if it is not hermeneutically desirable to break up the tension that runs through Kant’s treatment of cosmopolitan right in favour of one or the other interpretations,\textsuperscript{23} it is not possible, either, to cultivate the coherentist dream of a Kant that succeeds in compressing in a single formula all the dynamics that inform the complex relationship between the visitor’s rights and those of the visited. This is because in both cases one risks, in any case, losing the richness of Kant’s cosmopolitical proposal.

5.

Spirit of trade, communication, promise of interaction and mutual exchange of perspectives on one side, aggressive politics of economic expansion, and abuse of other people’s property and phenomena of forced civilization on the other populate the terrestrial ground on which Kant intends to start to build his cosmopolitical project of peace.

It is not by chance that common possession of ground is brought into play, in \textit{Metaphysics of Morals}, not only to affirm the right of the visitor that voluntarily goes to others’ lands, but also to protect the condition of those who in that part of earth have been placed by nature and chance – in short, of those who were born there. For Kant, both seem to be citizens of the world with an equal right. They are first of all the inhabitants of the land in view of which a cosmopolitan right has to be at once affirmed and limited. This is because, as Kant himself says with a problematic formula, common possession of land does not found a \textit{community} of possession. That is to say, it does not refer to common use of the territory or even

\textsuperscript{22}Perhaps laying too much stress on the elements of friction present in Kant’s cosmopolitanism, Derrida (1997a, 65-67, 73; 1997, 50-57) reads cosmopolitan right in the light of an antinomy between the imperative demand for unconditional hospitality and the need to translate hospitality into the legal form of norms regulating its concrete application. Detailed criticism of this interpretation is found in Brown (2010); in this connection I take the liberty of referring the reader to Cicatello (2015). Over and above the interpretative distortions which in effect are evident, Derrida’s reading has at any rate done not a little to bring out in the contemporary debate the enormous hermeneutic potential contained in Kant’s cosmopolitan right, showing its importance in relation to the issues of immigration and political asylum.

\textsuperscript{23}Waligore (2009, 29-31), for example, denounces the vice of partiality of readings that, like that of J. Waldron (e.g. 1999, 230), exaggerate the significance of the right to visit as a norm that promotes and stimulates contact and communication among peoples, to the detriment of attention to the decisive obstacles that forms of interaction and non-consensual society can bring into play along the pathway toward realization of a cosmopolitical order of peace. However, no less vitiated by partiality are readings that exclusively aim at the anti-colonialist motif, strongly reducing the meaning of the right to visit as an individual right to free circulation and communication. Cf. in this respect the objections made to M. Caimi (1997) by Belfort (2007, 137).
to a sort of primitive common ownership. It only describes a situation – a situation of possible *commercium* among men (Cf. MS, AA 06: 352.17-18).

It could be said with an extreme formula that this common possession of ground does not exist. And in fact it does not, except as an idea of reason, that to which Kant, as we have seen, makes reference as to the idea of a “determinate whole (bestimmtes Ganze)” (MS, AA 06: 352.13), only beginning from which the parts are conceivable. What is at stake here, precisely, is the sense of a whole, whose content, as a concept of reason, cannot consist in the simple empirical sum of the parts, but must, if anything, imply the possibility that the partiality of the parts is overcome. In *The Metaphysics of Morals* Kant speaks, not by chance, of original common possession as of “a practical rational concept which contains *a priori* the principle in accordance with which alone people can use a place on the earth in accordance with principles of right.” (MS, AA 06: 262.32-34)

The possibility of using or establishing legitimate ownership of a part of the ground is founded upon the presupposition of being able to think of ourselves as beings that inhabit the part of a determinate whole, that is to say of the earth’s surface seen as a globe.

Without having developed this rational disposition, we can at most conceive an idea of the whole, and therefore of the world that we inhabit, according to the

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24 Use of the term “*commercium* (Wechselwirkung)” exhibits a precise semantic value in relation to the model of community that Kant conceives in the sign of cosmopolitan right. The community of terrestrial ground does not correspond to a “rightful community of possession (communio)” (MS, AA 06: 352.16). The right to original common possession refers, rather, to the possibility “of offering to engage in commerce with any other [sich zum Verkehr untereinander anzubieten]” (MS, AA 06: 352.19-20), to the possibility of setting up relationships – where it is decisive to understand on what conditions the action of proposing oneself to form a society can favour, and not prevent, the progressive constitution of lasting peace. The stress is therefore not on static possession, as if there were something given to share as a common heritage, but on the possibility of a dynamic interaction beginning from which, for Kant, there is constituted the specific sense of the cosmopolitical community. In other words, defining the sense of the community of terrestrial ground is not sharing of something given, whether it is a closed space within fixed confines or a determined system of cultural values, or even claiming possession of the rational faculty seen as a physiological endowment of the man. This community is defined, rather, always and only in the dynamic form of *commercium*, of mutual action (Wechselwirkung). It may be useful, in this connection, to remember that in *Critique of Pure Reason* the term “*commercium*” and the distinction from the term “*communio*” occurs in the context of the discussion of the Third Analogy of Experience, to indicate a meaning of community as founded upon mutual action: “Thus it is necessary for all substances in appearance, insofar as they are simultaneous, to stand in thoroughgoing community of interaction with each other. The word ‘community (Gemeinschaft)’ is ambiguous in our language, and can mean either *communio* or *commercium*. We use it here in the latter sense, as a dynamical community, without which even the local community (*communio spatii*) could never be empirically cognized” (KrV, A 213 B 260 [translated by P. Guyer and A.W. Wood: I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998]). The fact that Kant speaks in *The Metaphysics of Morals* of “*commercium*” in relation to the community of the soil, corresponds, in conclusion, to the insistence on the dynamic-relational character of his idea of cosmopolitical society, where what is decisive is not the constitution of a society on the basis of what is common, but the formation of a community on a basis of exchange of what it is different.

25 Again in *The Metaphysics of Morals* Kant speaks of the “original community of land” as of an “idea that has objective (rightfully practical) reality” (MS, AA 06: 251.01-03). As Cavallar (2002, 363) says: “the ‘original community’ is, analogous to the original contract, not a historical fact but a rational idea. ‘Original’ refers to principles of reason, in contrast to a ‘primitive’ community, which has a historical or temporal dimension.”
extension of the confines of that part on which we have established settlement. And exactly defusing the potential of violence contained in this sedentary and at once expansionist idea of cosmopolitanism is the aim of Kant’s distinction between right to visit and right to reside.

Thus, if the simple fact of presenting oneself to the other to form a society cannot, in principle, justify an aggressive reaction in the other, on the other hand such a society cannot be deceitfully thrust on people, possibly with the justification that the other has not yet reached that civil level of rationality that alone could take him out of the wild state. In short, before the possibility of a world legal institution permanently preserving peace, what is involved, with cosmopolitan right, is the very right to reason – that reason that because of its human terrestrial characteristics, cannot, like the earth’s surface, be simply cut up to the advantage of those who aim to appropriate it to themselves, taking it from others. Beginning from this perspective, then, the right to visit can take on a different meaning than that of a simple restrictive form of hospitality. It becomes an expression of the critical idea of reason, that is to say of an idea of reason that is not simply given naturally to all men as a common anthropological endowment, but requires to be founded on the cosmopolitical terrain of mutual exchange. Every individual can legitimately claim possession of it, only on condition that he or she does not deny any other the possibility of entering it. We are talking, to go back to the opening reflections, of a deduction in the Kantian sense of the term: from reason as _quaestio facti_ to reason as _quaestio iuris_ of humanity. Through this deduction of the idea of reason the human terrestrial horizon is delimited, so that it can become fit to found political relationships and to form customs and institutions. From this point of view, from the point of view of reason seen as original common possession that becomes ours only insofar as we become able to concede to others the same right to enter it, we could say that for Kant we are all at once hosts and hosted, visitors and visited. In other words, insistence on the distinction between visit and residence characterizes the sense in which every man, for Kant, can legitimately refer to himself possession of reason, that is to say of that territory on which we cannot establish our settlement excluding others from entering it, without losing ourselves the right to live there. It seems to me that in the last analysis we can identify here the sense of the “philosophical sketch” that drives Kant’s cosmopolitical discourse. And it is also here perhaps that Kant’s fundamental...

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26 From this point of view Kant’s reference to the spherical form of the earth as a circumscribed surface on which men cannot infinitely disperse presents more than a metaphorical link with the idea, expressed in _Critique of Pure Reason_, of reason that must be considered not as an extended plane, but as a sphere, and therefore as a space whose limits can be determined (cf. _KrV_, A 792 B 790). The job of the critic of reason, aiming to establish the limits of human reason, or if we like the limits within which reason can be considered human, from the beginning innervates Kant’s cosmopolitical project. On the link between critique of pure reason and cosmopolitanism cf. Bösch (2007, 480).
contribution must be sought, in order for us to able to reconsider the theme of hospitality today, without falling easy preys to the conflict between the champions of cultural identity and national sovereignty and the theorists of unconditional hospitality that in the word “identity” points a finger at the origin of all evil.
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Abstract: What is the meaning of the Kantian “right to visit”? What role does it play in his cosmopolitan project of peace? Kant scholars answer differently. Two opposite interpretive tendencies can be traced paradigmatically. One position points out freedom of circulation of the stranger as a condition of communication and peaceful coexistence between peoples. The other sees the constitutional limitation of the right to visit as a starting point for the creation of a global society. Kant’s philosophy offers elements that go beyond both interpretations. However, this only becomes apparent when the right to visit is read from a new perspective that goes beyond the specific space of the Kantian doctrine of right. The right to visit and the difference from the right to inhabit should be considered in connection with the broad architectural design of Kant’s thought. There is a deep connection between the right to visit as founded on common possession of the Earth, and the nature of reason as a field that only becomes our property insofar as we make ourselves able to grant others the same right to enter it. From this point of view we must all be at once hosts and guests.

Keywords: Kant, Reason, Deduction, Cosmopolitan Right, Hospitality

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