Causality, antinomies, and Kant’s way to the Critique

José Oscar de Almeida Marques*
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Campinas, Brasil)

Andrea Faggion**
Universidade Estadual de Londrina (Londrina, Brasil)
Universidade Estadual de Maringá (Maringá, Brasil)

According to the Prolegomena, Kant seems to have been awakened from his “dogmatic slumber” not once but twice. In the Preface,\footnote{See Prol., AA 4: 260.} he referred to the impact that Hume’s criticism of the notion of cause and effect had in his metaphysical investigations, and to how he was led to generalize Hume’s problem about causality, developing and solving it in its fullest extent in the Critique of pure reason. On the other hand, in the Third Part of the Main Transcendental Question,\footnote{See Prol., AA 4: 338.} in a passage that is corroborated in a 1798 letter to Garve,\footnote{See Br., AA 12: 257-258.} he credited his awakening to the discovery of the antinomies as a product of reason in its transcendent use.

These remarks lead naturally to two questions. Firstly, one would like to know when this “awakening” occurred, and which texts of Hume may have had this effect in Kant’s thought. Secondly, one may want to understand how the two reports of the awakening are related: are we dealing with two different and independent triggers (Hume’s criticism of causality and the discovery of the antinomies) or are they in fact different aspects of a single insight?

As to the timing of the awakening, three possibilities may be considered:
1) An early awakening, in the 1760s, motivated by Kant’s reading of the German translation of Hume’s Enquiry on human understanding, published in 1755.
2) A late awakening, associated with Kant’s reading of the German translation of Beattie’s *Essay on the nature and immutability of truth*, published in 1772.

3) An intermediate possibility, in which the awakening would have been sparked by Hamann’s translation of the Conclusion of Book I of Hume’s *Treatise of human nature*, which Kant would have read around the time of his 1770 *Dissertation*.

In what follows we will critically examine each of these possibilities and consider, for each one, whether Hume’s role in the awakening is limited to the analysis of causality or may extend also to the discovery of the antinomies. Since our chief interest here is to assess Hume’s influence on the development of Kant’s critical philosophy, we will not be concerned about other obvious non-Humean sources of Kant’s antinomical thinking, as the Leibniz-Clarke controversy.

* *

We may begin with the very words with which Kant presents his debt to Hume. “I freely admit”, he says, “that the *Erinnerung* of David Hume was the very thing that many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber”.\(^4\) And here we have a situation where the translation of a single word may have interpretative consequences. For *Erinnerung* may mean a remembrance, a recollection (as it is translated respectively by Hatfield and Lewis Beck), which could point to a late awakening, in which Kant would have remembered his former reading of Hume in the 1750s or 1760s. Or it may mean just a remark, a suggestion (as translated respectively by Zöller and Carus), and in this case it could refer just to the first contact of Kant with Hume’s ideas, that is, to an early awakening.

Let us consider first the hypothesis of an early awakening, produced by the reading of the *Enquiry*. There is much in favor of this interpretation. There is no doubt that Kant was deeply impressed by Hume’s ideas and that he agreed entirely with Hume’s conception of causality. A passage like this one from the *Dreams of a spirit-seer* (1766) could very well be signed by Hume himself:

> It’s impossible for reason ever to understand how something can be a cause, or have a force; such relations can only be derived from experience. For our rule of reason only governs the drawing of comparisons in respect of identity and contradiction. If something is a cause, the something is posited by something else, there is not, however,

\(^4\) Prol., AA 4: 260.
any connection between the two things here which is based on agreement. Similarly, if I refuse to regard that same something as a cause, no contradiction will ever arise, for there is no contradiction in supposing that, if something is posited, something else is cancelled. It follows from this that if the fundamental concepts of things as causes, of powers and of actions are not derived from experience, then they are wholly arbitrary, and they admit of neither proof nor refutation. I know, of course, that thinking and willing move my body, but I can never reduce this phenomenon, as a simple experience, to another phenomenon by means of analysis; hence, I can recognize the phenomenon but I cannot understand it. That my will moves my arm is no more intelligible to me than someone’s claiming that my will could halt the moon in its orbit.  

Thus, it seems safe to say that around 1766 Kant had become a moderate skeptic with regards to the claims of metaphysics, and in that sense had already been awakened from the “dogmatic slumber”. One should also note that everything that Kant says in the _Prolegomena_ concerning the influence of Hume on his intellectual development can be referred to what he had read earlier in the _Enquiry_.

Still more interesting is that if we date Kant’s awakening back to the time of his reading of the _Enquiry_, it becomes plausible that Hume is, after all, connected with both factors mentioned by Kant in the _Prolegomena_: the criticism of causality and the discovery of the antinomies, for in the last section of his book Hume argued at length that reason falls into contradictions when it pursues its abstract reasonings. It is true that arguments to the effect that reason contradicts itself had been proposed since antiquity, but no philosopher in Kant’s time was able to present them in a more powerful manner than Hume, and one may expect that they made a deep impression on Kant. It is remarkable that...

---

5 TG, AA 2: 270.  
7 Brandt (1992, p. 105, n. 10).  
8 “Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspense, which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her a diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she treads. She sees a full light, which illuminates certain places; but that light borders upon the most profound darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance concerning any one object. […] Yet still reason must remain restless, and unquiet, even with regard to that scepticism, to which she is driven by these seeming absurdities and contradictions. How any clear, distinct idea can contain circumstances, contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct idea, is absolutely incomprehensible; and is, perhaps, as absurd as any proposition, which can be formed.” (EHU, 12.2, §§ 18 and 20)  
9 “Since Hume is perhaps the most ingenious of all skeptics, and is incontrovertibly the preeminent one with regard to the influence that the skeptical procedure can have on awakening a thorough examination of reason, it is well worth the trouble to make clear, to the extent that is appropriate to my aim, the path of his inferences and the aberrations of such an insightful and valuable man, which nevertheless began on the trail of truth.” (KrV, A 764/ B 792)
Hume traces back these contradictions to the ideas of space and time, and to the (metaphysical) doctrine of their infinite divisibility.

This being so, one may wonder that paragraphs 18-20 of the Enquiry contains not only the germ of the discovery of the antinomies by Kant, but even pointed the way to their solution later on. But even if we admit that Kant woke up around the time he first read the Enquiry, skepticism is not the end point, and there is still a long way to the perfecting of the critical project. The question gets still more complicated by the fact that Kant seems to have fallen back into his dogmatic sleep a few years later, when he wrote his Dissertation. We will discuss this point more closely later, but, for the moment, it seems that something else had to happen in order to bring him back to the critical path, and it is here that a theory of a later (or second) awakening seems necessary.

What may have happened, according to a well-known hypothesis advanced by Robert P. Wolff, was that in 1772 Kant got acquainted with the German translation of James Beattie’s Essay on the nature and immutability of truth (originally published in 1770), a severe attack on Hume’s philosophy, which had, however, the merit of quoting extensively many theses of the Treatise that Kant could not have known based solely in his reading of the Enquiry. Chief among these is Hume’s attack on the a priori character of the general maxim that every event must have a cause. This attack, according to Wolff, should be much more challenging to Kant than Hume’s criticism of particular causal inferences which was presented in the Enquiry, and provided the opportunity for a complete revaluation of the problems associated with the concept of cause, more specifically, the problem of how such an a priori concept could have any application to an independent reality. In fact, Erdmann already had, much earlier, proposed that Kant’s awakening had happened in 1772, and could be better understood as a

10 “The chief objection against all abstract reasonings is derived from the ideas of space and time; ideas, which, in common life and to a careless view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they pass through the scrutiny of the profound sciences (and they are the chief object of these sciences) afford principles, which seem full of absurdity and contradiction.” (EHU, 12.2, § 18)

11 “A real quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on in infinitum; this is an edifice so bold and prodigious, that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to support, because it shocks the clearest and most natural principles of human reason. But what renders the matter more extraordinary, is, that these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning, the clearest and most natural; nor is it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the consequences.” (EHU, 12.2, § 18)

12 See Wolff (1960, p. 119).
reaction to the broader attack of the *Treatise*. What Wolff provided was an explanation of how Kant might become acquainted with this broader attack, namely, through the reading of Beattie’s book.

Wolff’s proposal is interesting and can explain why Kant would have “remembered” Hume at the time of his awakening. It is possible to argue, however, that the *Enquiry* already contained everything that was needed for Kant to infer that Hume’s criticism of the a priori character of particular causal relations applied equally well to the causal maxim as such; in fact, in a passage of the Second Analogy Kant seems to be making exactly this inference:

To be sure, it seems as this contradicts everything that has always been said about the course of the use of our understanding, according to which it is only through the perception and comparison of sequences of many occurrences on preceding appearances that we are led to discover a rule, in accordance with which certain occurrences always follow certain appearances, and are thereby first prompted to form the concept of cause. On such a footing this concept would be merely empirical, and the rule that it supplies, that *everything that happens has a cause*, would be just as contingent as the experience itself: its universality and necessity would then be merely feigned, and would have no true universal validity, since they would not be grounded a priori but only on induction.

Besides, there are evidences that certain theses of Hume’s philosophy peculiar to the *Treatise* remained unknown to Kant at least until the time of the *Prolegomena*. To start with, if Kant had been acquainted with Hume’s analyses of the concept of substance (external existence) he would not say that he had generalized Hume’s problem, for he would have seen that this generalization had already been at least sketched by Hume himself. What is more, this passage of the first

13 See Wolff (1960, p. 119).
14 Indeed, Paul Guyer claims that the reading of Beattie’s book could not have allowed Kant to know more about Hume’s treatment of issues regarding causation than he had already learned from the reading of the *Enquiry* (see Guyer, 2008, p. 76, n. 2). Even though we do believe that the *Enquiry* provided everything that was necessary for Kant’s awakening, it may be important to note that Guyer bases his claim on his own reading of the 1776 edition of Beattie’s work, while the translation read by Kant (published in 1772) was based on an early edition (the original one from 1770). This is problematic, because, in January 1776, Hume appended to all new copies of his *Essays and treatises on several subjects* an Advertisement in which he declared to be unfair to use the *Treatise*, a work of his youth, as a basis for any criticism of his philosophy. Accordingly, in the Preface of the edition of Beattie’s book used by Guyer, Beattie even quoted Hume’s Advertisement, that had been just sent to him by a friend from London (see Beattie, 2005, pp. vii–viii). This being so, according to Wolff, Beattie would have amended his own work, removing portions quoted from the *Treatise*, in order to address Hume’s Advertisement. This is why Wolff (1960, p. 121) considers it a mistake (already made by Kemp-Smith) not to pay attention to the edition of Beattie’s work available to Kant.
15 KrV, A 195-196/ B 240-241, our italics; it should be noted that everything that comes before “On such a footing” is already contained in the *Enquiry*.
Critique proves that Kant was not acquainted with such a Humean analyses:

The skeptical aberrations of this otherwise extremely acute man, however, arose primarily from a failing that he had in common with all dogmatists, namely, that he did not systematically survey all the kinds of a priori synthesis of the understanding. For had he done so, he would have found, not to mention any others here, e.g., principle of persistence is one that anticipates experience just as much as of causality.  

Be that as it may, we think it is plausible to say that the reading of Beattie’s book, even if brought no new information that was needed for Kant’s awakening, may have acted as a psychological trigger (a “remembrance”) that led Kant to a new consideration of the problems lurking in the concept of cause and effect.

* 

While Wolff’s conception of a late awakening leaves no room to relate it with the discovery of the antinomies, there are two other important accounts, due to Manfred Kuehn and to Lothar Kreimendahl, for which this connection is essential. Both Kuehn and Kreimendahl may be seen as proponents of an “intermediate awakening”, around the time of the Dissertation. Also, both believe that what caused the awakening was Kant’s reading of the Conclusion of the first book of Hume’s Treatise, translated to German by Hamann around that time. But there are also some differences between their accounts, which we will discuss presently.

We will consider first Manfred Kuehn’s paper “Kant’s conception of ‘Hume’s problem’”, published in 1983. What is new in Kuehn’s proposal is the attempt to fuse together the two “triggers” that Kant mentions in the Prolegomena: the criticism of causality and the discovery of the antinomies, and to argue that Hume’s contribution was decisive in both issues, and that “the problem of the antinomies is just another aspect of the problem of Hume”.  

Without denying the importance of the last section of the Enquiry nor of the excerpts of the Treatise presented in Beattie’s book, Kuehn believes that the decisive impulse for Kant’s awakening happened in 1771, the year of the publication of Hamann’s translation of the Conclusion of the first book of Hume’s Treatise.

---

16 KrV, A 767/ B 795.
Although Kuehn’s proposal is very well argued and represents a major contribution to the study of Hume’s influence in the origin of Kant’s critical philosophy, it depends, in our view, on two crucial assumptions. The first is that, if the awakening depends on the discovery of the antinomies, then it depends on the discovery of contradictions among laws of reason itself, what would not have happened before 1771. The second is that Hume, for his part, would have grasped a proper concept of antinomy when he described an “unavoidable contradiction” between natural principles of the human mind; and thus, Kant’s antinomy of reason would have been modeled on Hume’s so called “antinomy of imagination”. It seems to us that both these assumptions are questionable.

Concerning the first, one could say not only that Kant had already made the essential discovery of the antinomies before 1771, but also that he had even presented a solution for them by means of the discovery of transcendental idealism in his 1770 Dissertation. In other words, Kant would have discovered the origin of reason’s internal contradictions and how to avoid them even before he was in a position to systematically formulate them and give them their proper place in the Critique’s architetonic. After all, as it is declared explicitly in the first Critique, the key to solving the cosmological dialectic is the conception of objects intuited in space and time, – i. e., objects of possible experience – as appearances instead of things in themselves. Now, not by chance, already in his Dissertation, Kant warns us that “the gravest errors” derive from the belief that an object of pure reason comes under the laws of intuitive cognition, what amounts to taking a “subjective resistance” for an “objective inconsistency”. Indeed, in a letter to Lambert dated of September 2nd, 1770, Kant claims that time and space “are actually the conditions of all appearances

---

18 “The key is already provided, though its initial use is unfamiliar and therefore difficult. It consists in this: that all objects that are given to us can be interpreted in two ways [nach zweierlei Begriffen nehmen kann] on the one hand, as appearances, on the other hand, as things in themselves. If one takes appearances to be things in themselves and demands of those [als von solchen] [appearances] the absolutely unconditioned in the series of conditions, one gets into nothing but contradictions. These contradictions, however, fall away when one shows that there cannot be anything wholly unconditioned among appearances; such a thing could exist among things in themselves. On the other hand, if one takes a thing in itself (which can contain the condition of something in the world) to be an appearance, one creates contradictions where none are necessary, for example, in the matter of freedom, and this contradiction falls away as soon as attention is paid to the variable meaning that objects can have” (Letter to Garve, August 7, 1783, Br, AA 10: 341n. See also KrV, A 496-497/ B 524-525). It must be noted that i) the “key” depends only on the removing of things in themselves from time and space; ii) the “key” applies equally to the last stage of the antinomies formulation, even though it seems to have been attained before it.

19 MSI, AA 2: 389.
and of all empirical judgments. But extremely mistaken conclusions emerge if we apply the basic concepts of sensibility to something that is not at all an object of sense, that is, something thought through a universal or a pure concept of the understanding as a thing or substance in general, and so on.20 what is basically the same claim made more than a decade later in Section Six of the antinomy of Pure Reason: Transcendental Idealism as the Key to Solving the Cosmological Dialectic. Certainly it does not make sense to believe that Kant would have been awakened only in 1771, by the discovery of the antinomies, when there is such a strong evidence that he had already discovered the key to solving the antinomies at least since 1770.

Concerning Kuehn’s second assumption, although Hume does mention a contradiction in the operations of imagination in the Conclusion of Book I of the Treatise,21 he by no means explains there how this contradiction arises, and the passages in the book that could be related to it (e.g., I.4.4.15) are quite enigmatic to say the least. Therefore, it is not much plausible that Kant would be so provoked by the bare unexplained mention of such a contradiction, nor that he would have discovered there something that he could not have already learned through his much earlier reading of the Enquiry on human understanding, section 12, where Hume details how clear and distinct ideas may contain contradictory circumstances in relation to themselves or to other clear and distinct ideas, leading reason to skepticism.

At least the first difficulty mentioned above can be avoided by Lothar Kreimendahl’s interpretation of the awakening in his book Kant – Der Durchbruch von 1769, published in 1990.22 Like Kuehn, Kreimendahl sees Hamann’s translation of the last section of Book I of the Treatise as the turning point in Kant’s development, but unlike Kuehn, he argues (or rather conjectures) that Kant got acquainted with that translation in 1769 long before it was published, because Hamann

20 Br., AA 10: 98.

21 “’Tis this principle, which makes us reason from causes and effects; and ’tis the same principle, which convinces us of the continu’d existence of external objects, when absent from the senses. But tho’ these two operations be equally natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in some circumstances they are directly contrary, nor is it possible for us to reason justly and regularly from causes and effects, and at the same time believe the continu’d existence of matter. How then shall we adjust those principles together? Which of them shall we prefer? Or in case we prefer neither of them, but successively assent to both, as is usual among philosophers, with what confidence can we afterwards usurp that glorious title, when we thus knowingly embrace a manifest contradiction?” (THN, I, 4.7.5). In his paper Kuehn does not discuss this passage in order to clarify its meaning, and, what is more surprising, does not discuss it not even in his (1983b) paper on “Hume’s Antinomies”, published in that same year in Hume Studies.

22 We base our conclusions on the extensive and detailed review written by Reinhard Brandt for Kant Studien (1992).
would have shown it to him. Thus, according to Kreimendahl’s theory, Kant would have grasped the most essential aspect of the problem of the antinomies before writing the 1770 Dissertation, what we claim must be the case.

However, as Reinhard Brandt argues in his review of Kreimendahl’s book, Kreimendahl does not present any direct evidence that Kant might have read Hamann’s translation at the time – it just seems that he wants this to have happened, in order that his theory may work. Brandt notices that, for Kreimendahl, three very different circumstances had to be united, almost miraculously in that year of 1769: 1) Kant’s development in the direction of the diagnostic of an antinomy of reason reaches a crucial point; 2) he reads a text by Hume in which this antinomy is formulated; and 3) he discovers the solution of the antinomies through the ideality of space and time. Certainly it is quite contrived to pile up so many factors in a single period, just to associate Hume’s skepticism with the Kantian dialectic.

Brandt recognizes that Kreimendahl’s book contains some important contributions, especially in its reconstruction of the historical antecedents of the problem of the antinomy in Kant’s development in the 1760s, but observes that this very reconstruction destroys the author’s thesis that the reading of Hume in Hamann’s translation could have had any influence on Kant’s discovery of the antinomies. Moreover, as we already argued above, there is nothing in Hamann’s translation that Kant did not already know through his much earlier reading of the Enquiry.

The discussion above shows, in our opinion, that it is not much fruitful to look for an account of Kant’s awakening that pinpoints a single event or episode in his intellectual development as the moment in which he left his dogmatic sleep. Rather, we believe that we must understand this awakening as a process that involved distinct steps, which may be sketched as follows:

1) Some time after 1755 Kant reads Hume’s Enquiry in the German edition published by Sulzer. He uses Hume’s texts in his courses in Koenigsberg and gradually falls under his influence, coming to doubt that metaphysics is logically possible and becoming a skeptic of some sort. This stage culminates in 1766 with the publication of the Dreams of a Spirit Seer, which contained the clearest expression of Kant’s anti-

---

dogmatic doctrines at the time. One may very well, if one wishes, to see here the first rupture with dogmatism, a first awakening, motivated equally by Hume’s criticism of causality and the discovery of internal contradictions in the operations of reason. Hume’s presentation of skeptical arguments in the last section of the *Enquiry* not only may have led Kant to the discovery of the antinomies but possibly also pointed the way to their solution, since Hume explicitly traced the contradictions of reason back to the notions of space and time. With the discovery of transcendental idealism in 1769 (the “great light”) Kant had finally a way to dissolve every apparent contradiction in the operations of reason. It would be enough to avoid the mistake of attributing to *noumena* what is proper to *phenomena*, that is, spatial and temporal qualities, and metaphysics would be again (at least, logically) possible. After all, a reason free of sensible conditions is a reason free of antinomical threats. This explains the optimism of the *Dissertation*, which can be seen as a fall back into the “dogmatic slumber”.

2) In the following years, again possibly due to some new contacts with Hume’s philosophy and, in special, his theory of causation, Kant realized that he had not assured yet that intellectual (a priori) representations can be related to independent objects, an issue clearly formulated in a famous letter to Marcus Herz, from February 21, 1772. Once the problem with metaphysical paradoxes had been solved by the discovery of transcendental idealism in 1769, Kant was still in need of explaining how intellectual concepts “given by the very nature of the understanding” may refer to objects that they have not been abstracted from. Thus, although the logical possibility of metaphysics had been ascertained (it was free of contradictions), there was no guarantee of its real possibility, or, in other words, no guarantee that our concepts may

---

25 “Initially I saw this doctrine as if in twilight. I tried quite earnestly to prove propositions and their opposite, not in order to establish a skeptical doctrine, but rather because I suspected I could discover in what an illusion of the understanding was hiding. The year ’69 gave me a great light.” (R. 5037, Refl., AA 18: 69) It is important to emphasize that, according to our reading, the “great light” does not coincide with the time of initiation of the Critical project. As Falkenstein pointed out against Kreimendahl’s claims regarding 1769 being the time of Kant’s awakening, one can wonder “a morning of long, hard work before the great light shines” (1995, p. 71). Before the great light shines, as Kant said, he saw a doctrine as if in twilight. Thus, we are suggesting that Kant’s first contact with the *Enquiry* may have been in this twilight.

26 “…how my understanding may, completely a priori, form for itself concepts of things with which the facts should necessarily agree and […] how my understanding may formulate real principles concerning the possibility of such concepts, with which principles experience must be in exact agreement and which nevertheless are independent of experience – this question, of how the faculty of the understanding achieves this conformity with the things themselves is still left in a state of obscurity.” (Br., AA 10: 130, our italics)

refer to objects. Hence, a new problem of the possibility of metaphysics appears, and here we could locate a “second” awakening.

This two-step awakening, based on two different problems regarding metaphysics, namely, the problems of its logical and real possibility, is suggested by Kant himself:

I saw at that time that this putative science [metaphysics] lacked a reliable touchstone with which to distinguish truth from illusion, since different but equally persuasive metaphysical propositions lead inescapably to contradictory conclusions, with the result that one proposition inevitably casts doubt on the other. […] In the year 1770 I was already able clearly to distinguish sensibility in our cognition from the intellectual, by means of precise limiting conditions. The main steps in this analysis were expressed in my Dissertation (mixed with many theses that I should not accept today) […] But then the problem of the source of the intellectual elements in our cognition created new and unforeseen difficulties…

Perhaps, we should preferably abandon the “awakening” metaphor in favor of a richer development history, in which two different questions are introduced and answered at different times. In any case, it seems that it is useless to look for a single and decisive moment in which Kant emerges from the traditional metaphysical background fully equipped with the critical apparatus.

References


Letter to Bernoulli, November 16, 1781, Br., AA 10: 277-278.


**Abstract:** According to the Prolegomena, Kant was awakened from his “dogmatic slumber” not once but twice. In the Preface, he referred to the impact of Hume’s criticism of causality in his metaphysical investigations, but in the Third Part of the Main Transcendental Question, he credited his awakening to the discovery of the Antinomies as a product of reason in its transcendent use.
These two accounts have traditionally led to two mutually exclusive explanations of the origin of Kant’s critical philosophy, one that places great importance on Hume’s influence, and other in which this influence is seen as minimal or even non-existent. In this paper we will propose that both these subjects – antinomies and causality – can be referred to Hume and have a complementary role in Kant’s critical development, as distinct questions that gave rise, each, to a distinct stage in the long way that led to the Critique of pure reason.

Keywords: Kant, Hume, causality, antinomies, dogmatic slumber

Resumo: De acordo com os Prolegômenos, Kant foi despertado de seu “sono dogmático”, não uma, mas duas vezes. No Prefácio, ele se referiu ao impacto da crítica de Hume à causalidade em suas investigações metafísicas, mas, na Terceira Parte da Questão Transcendental Principal, ele creditou seu despertar à descoberta das antinomias como um produto da razão em seu uso transcendental. Tradicionalmente, essas duas abordagens levam a duas explicações mutuamente exclusivas da origem da filosofia crítica de Kant, uma que confere grande importância à influência de Hume, e outra em que essa influência é vista como mínima ou mesmo como não-existente. Neste artigo, propomos que ambos os assuntos – antinomias e causalidade – podem ser remetidos a Hume e têm um papel complementar no desenvolvimento crítico de Kant, como questões distintas que dão ensejo, cada uma, a um estágio distinto no longo caminho que levou à Crítica da razão pura.

Palavras-chave: Kant, Hume, causalidade, antinomias, sono dogmático

Received on 25/07/2013; approved on 30/09/2013.